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Intellectual capital disclosure from sell-side analyst perspective 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – Research on the use/disclosure of intellectual capital (IC) information by 
sell-side analysts, using content analysis of their reports, is growing. The objectives of 
this paper are to establish the importance of this perspective in understanding the role 
of IC in communicating firm value, to introduce possible theoretical frameworks to 
interpret the findings of such studies, and to propose methodological developments.  
Methodology/approach – The paper argues for the need to look at IC from the 
perspective of sell-side analysts, and then advocates the use of several theoretical 
frameworks to enrich current understanding of the role of IC as it is used/disclosed by 
sell-side analysts. Current methodologies used in this type of research are critiqued 
with a view to proposing multiple research methods.  
Findings – Looking at IC from the sell-side analyst perspective helps us to 
understand how the capital market appreciates this information. However, IC 
information that analysts disclose cannot be taken at its face value. Issues of 
signalling, analysts’ incentives/influences, political economy view, and globalisation 
are introduced as providing theoretical frameworks for explaining IC disclosure in 
sell-side analysts’ reports. To obtain a richer picture of the role of IC information in 
analysts’ decision processes, multiple research methods are proposed.  
Practical implications – The proposals in this paper may inform and guide future 
research on IC information use/disclosure by sell-side analysts with theoretical 
underpinnings and methodological rigour.  
Originality/value – This paper is the first attempt to propose possible theories for 
interpreting findings of studies on IC use/discsloure by sell-side analysts and suggest 
multiple research methodologies in this type of research.  
Paper type – Conceptual 
Keywords – Analyst reports, Content analysis, Intellectual capital, Intellectual capital 
disclosure, Sell-side analysts 
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1. Introduction 
 
Changes in the business environment from the industrial era to the new economy have 
transformed the corporate value creation process and strategy, particularly for firms in 
non-traditional industries (Lev & Zarowin, 1999). The potential for creating 
competitive advantage and long-term corporate value now lies more importantly in 
effective management of intangibles or intellectual capital (IC
1
) than in tangible 
assets. In keeping with the changes in the corporate value creation process, traditional 
financial reporting systems have become inadequate in providing useful information 
for stakeholders’ decision-making, due to their limitations in the identification and 
measurement of IC in organisations.  
 
Guthrie, Petty & Johanson (2001) identified two evolving IC missions: (1) developing 
systems for creating, capturing and disseminating IC within organisations’ for internal 
strategic decision-making, and (2) establishing new measures, and ways of reporting 
externally the value attributable to IC. These missions encompass the information 
needs of managers for internal management of the firm and the information needs of 
investors for valuing the firm as an investment opportunity. 
 
                                                 
1
 The literature commonly describes IC as including external (relational) capital, internal (structural) 
capital and human (competence) capital. Abeysekera and Guthrie (2005) provide a comprehensive list 
of IC items, with the external capital category comprising 10 IC items, categorised as brand-building, 
corporate image-building, business partnering, distribution channels and market share; the human 
capital category comprising 25 IC items, categorised as training and development, equity issues, 
employee relations, employee welfare, employee-related measurements, entrepreneurial skills, and 
employee safety; and the internal capital category comprising 10 IC items, categorised as processes, 
systems, intellectual property, philosophy, culture, and financial relations. 
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The proportional increase in the corporate value derived from IC has resulted in 
capital market intermediaries such as sell-side analysts and fund managers requesting 
more information about firms’ IC (Holland & Johanson, 2003). 
 
Barth, Kasznik and Mc Nichols (2001) contend that there is information asymmetry 
between firms and investors, especially in firms with substantial intangible assets. 
Regardless of the movement within firms towards greater disclosure of non-financial 
performance measures, and IC in particular, evidence suggests that firms disclose 
much less IC-related information than what analysts expect (García-Ayuso, 2003). 
 
IC reporting by firms has been studied in detail since the late 1990s. Researchers have 
examined IC disclosure in annual reports across countries and time, company 
websites, presentations to analysts, and IPO prospectuses. They have also investigated 
the determinants of IC disclosure by firms in different media. However, study of the 
use of IC by financial analysts is in its infancy. Research into the use of IC 
information by buy-side analysts is largely limited to the work of Holland (2001; 
2006), Holland and Johanson (2003) and Bukh and Nielsen (2006), using case study 
interviews. More research is needed in this direction. Research into the use of IC 
information by sell-side analysts has also benefited from case study methodology 
(e.g., Holland & Johanson, 2003; Johansson, 2007). Another method of investigating 
the use of IC by sell-side analysts is to analyse the IC information disclosed in their 
reports to investors. Such studies are largely descriptive and lack theoretical 
underpinning and methodological rigour. This paper is motivated by the growing 
research interest in the area of IC information use/disclosure by sell-side analysts, and 
aims to introduce multiple theories that can enhance the quality of future research. 
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Further, we discuss limitations of the methodologies currently employed in these 
studies and recommend multiple methods or triangulation as the way forward.  
 
The next section reviews the literature on use of IC information by sell-side analysts 
and IC disclosure in analyst reports. Section 3 discusses a number of theories that can 
enrich research on IC use/disclosure by sell-side analysts. Section 4 examines 
different research methods, recent trends, and ways to strengthen future research. 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
  
2. Literature review 
Two streams of IC disclosure-related literature can be clearly identified. One focuses 
on the extent and nature of IC disclosed by firms and the other pertains to the use of 
that information by financial analysts as presented in their reports. Financial analysts 
in the capital market comprise sell-side analysts and buy-side analysts. Sell-side 
analysts work for brokerage firms and produce public reports influencing the supply 
side of information. Institutional investors employ buy-side analysts to make 
recommendations, exclusively, on their asset portfolios.  
 
Schipper (1991) contends that sell-side analysts are among the primary users of 
accounting information and represent an important target group in financial reporting. 
Sell-side analysts’ reports are a primary source of information for buy-side analysts 
(Fogarty & Rogers, 2005; Holland, 2006; Holland & Johanson, 2003). Retail 
investors rely on secondary information sources such as sell-side analyst reports 
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through their stockbrokers
2
. Sell-side analyst use superior decision models and are 
trained at identifying and analysing the impact of both financial and non-financial 
value drivers. Rapid pace at which the market changes and the complexity of value 
creation process in the knowledge economy makes non-professionals more reliant on 
sell-side analyst advice and reports. The importance of sell-side analysts in the 
demand side of the market for corporate information underpin the large body of 
literature on analysts’ decision processes; and sell-side analysts’ valuation of firms is 
considered as a market proxy (Schipper, 1991). The status of sell-side analysts in the 
market for information makes them and their work (i.e. the analyst report), important 
subjects for research.  
 
The role of sell-side analysts involves more than calculating financial ratios and 
analysing financial data. IC is increasingly important in firm value creation, as 
evidenced by the widening gap between book value and market value of firms 
(Sveiby, 1997). This in turn makes it important to investigate how and what IC is 
incorporated in market prices using the work of sell-side analysts. In this context, a 
number of studies have been conducted on the use of non-financial information 
(e.g.,Fogarty & Rogers, 2005; Previts, Bricker, Robinson & Young, 1994) and IC 
information (e.g., Arvidsson, 2003; Flöstrand, 2006; García-Meca, 2005) in sell-side 
analyst reports. Research evidence suggests that sell-side analysts use non-financial 
and IC information extensively and they disclose such information in their reports. 
 
                                                 
2
 Epstein (1975) studied the information sources of retail investors and found stockbrokers, advisory 
services and financial press are considered as the most important information sources where as 
financial statements were of minor importance.  
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For sell-side analysts, a vital information source about firms is public documents the 
firms produce (Fogarty & Rogers, 2005). External disclosure of IC by companies 
have been argued and discussed since the late 1980s, as evidenced by the early works 
of Sveiby. Importance of IC was formally recognised by the accounting profession 
with the appointment of the Jenkins Committee of the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants in 1994 to address the challenge of voluntary disclosure of IC 
information in public documents such as annual reports. Certain firms, particularly in 
Europe, produce a separate IC statement to supplement their conventional annual 
report information deficit. Concurrent with these developments, the last decade has 
seen an enormous interest among firms, in many parts of the world, in supplying IC 
information in public documents.  
 
An enormous amount of work has been carried out in devising models and 
frameworks for identifying, classifying, measuring, managing and reporting IC within 
firms. Models such as the Balanced Scorecard, Skandia Business Navigator, Invisible 
Balance Sheet, and Technology Broker are results of the work of proponents in this 
domain. These models may assist information suppliers such as sell-side analysts, 
although the utility of some of these tools has mainly been in internal strategic 
decision-making. 
 
The difficulty of valuing IC disclosed in narrative sections in annual reports and other 
media has limited the ability to investigate the impact of IC on value creation. This 
explains the dearth of capital market value relevance studies on IC and the abundance 
of literature examining the impact of financial items recognised in the financial 
statements, such as accruals and cash flow, on aspects of value creation.  
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Some attributes of IC are specific to firms and others are less so. For instance, IC 
items in the internal capital category (e.g., management information systems, 
organisational culture) are specific to firms, whereas some external capital items (e.g., 
customer satisfaction) and some human capital items (e.g., relations with unions, 
involvement with the community) are less firm-specific. This difference has 
exacerbated the challenge of making statistically valid inferences about the 
relationship between various IC items and value creation of firms. IC and intangible 
assets are difficult resources to translate into prediction of stock prices because it is 
difficult to interpret how various elements of IC are linked in the value creation chain, 
and the value of IC is entangled with other assets (Mouritsen, 2003). 
 
Valuation relevance is an alternative approach to investigate the impact of IC on firm 
value creation. If an item of information is disclosed in sell-side analyst reports, it is 
said to be valuation relevant (Flöstrand & Ström, 2006). Therefore, analysing IC 
information disclosed in sell-side analysts’ reports can provide evidence of the 
usefulness of IC information in firm value creation. The literature on IC disclosure in 
sell-side analysts’ reports is mainly driven by this motivation. Studies investigating IC 
information use/disclosure by sell-side analysts, using content-analysis of their reports 
presented to the investing community, are increasing (e.g., Arvidsson, 2003; 
Flöstrand, 2006; García-Meca, 2005; Previts et al., 1994). 
 
3. Theoretical perspectives 
Prior literature focusing on disclosure of IC information in analysts’ reports is largely 
descriptive. These studies merely categorise IC disclosed in analysts’ reports into 
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various subcategories according to frequency of disclosure (e.g., Arvidsson, 2003; 
Flöstrand, 2006; García-Meca, 2005). None of these studies has used a theoretical 
framework to understand and interpret the findings of frequency of IC disclosure in 
analysts’ reports. 
 
Given the apparent lack of theoretical underpinning and explanation in the literature 
on IC information use/disclosure behaviour of sell-side analysts in their reports, we 
introduce four theoretical models to enrich research in this area. These are signalling, 
analysts’ incentives and influences, political economy view and globalisation. .  
 
3.1. Signalling 
Signalling is a way of responding to perceived market failure when the market does 
not have full information (Watts & Zimmermann, 1986). From a signalling 
perspective, more voluntary disclosure is interpreted by the capital market as ‘good 
news’ and less or no voluntary disclosure is interpreted as signalling ‘bad news’. 
Accordingly, firms should voluntarily disclose IC information to avoid undervaluation 
of their shares. Hunter, Webster and Wyatt (2005) explain that a prime motivation for 
external disclosure of IC is signalling expected future growth of the firm to external 
stakeholders.  
 
Management will only make voluntary IC disclosure as long as there is a marginal 
benefit to be gained from reducing the information asymmetry in the market. 
Management is believed to have sufficient incentive to disclose when the firm is 
dependent on stakeholders to continue as a going concern (Toms, 2002). Depending 
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on whether signals meet certain conditions
3
, stakeholders will believe some signals to 
be true and reject others. Credibility of the management and the incentive for 
management to signal may influence the level of IC related signals used by sell-side 
analysts. Empirical evidence suggests that analysts’ assessment of management 
credibility directly influence the use of future oriented management information by 
analysts (Barker, 1999). Invariably, these conditions may also dictate analysts’ IC 
information sources.  
 
On the basic premise that sell-side analysts meet the information needs of other 
stakeholders (i.e. buy-side analysts and retail investors), sell-side analysts play the 
role of information disseminator. The fact that buy-side analysts trade upon the share 
recommendations of sell-side analysts and achieve superior performance (Li, 2005) 
justifies this claim. They improve market efficiency by reducing information 
asymmetry and increasing the speed with which information is reflected in the market 
price (Healy & Palepu, 2001). The role of sell-side analysts is pertinent to 
disseminating IC information about firms, given the exponential growth of 
knowledge-based firms and the growing demand for knowledge-based products and 
services in the global economy.  
 
Signalling originates within the firm. Sell-side analysts as information intermediaries 
may redirect signals through their reports to the wider audience. Since sell-side 
analysts are more than mere information providers (e.g., substituting firm provided 
                                                 
3
 These conditions include management’s incentive to disclose, difficulty of imitating the signal, 
observable relationship between the firm disclosure and stakeholder perception, and cost-effectiveness 
of the signal.  
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information) (Lang & Lundholm, 1996), these signals may be modified and 
complemented by the analysts’ own interpretations and additional information.  
 
Bozzolan et al. (2003) contended that lack of institutional investors in the Italian stock 
market makes it unnecessary for managers to signal the market about creation of IC 
resources; thus explaining the low level of IC disclosure by Italian firms. On the other 
hand, IC information is highly proprietary. Many argue that the cost of IC disclosure 
outweighs its benefits, resulting in the low level of IC disclosure by firms. Thus in the 
absence of a signalling motivation by management, it is worthwhile to investigate 
how sell-side analysts use their reports to disclose IC information so as to inform the 
true value of the firm to the market. Future research could examine how signalling 
theory can interpret both the use and actual disclosure of IC information by sell-side 
analysts.  
 
3.2. Analysts’ incentives and influences 
Sell-side analysts’ work may be directly influenced by the stockbroking firm that 
employs the analysts, by institutional investors and their buy-side analysts. They may 
also be influenced indirectly through companies for which stockbroking firms provide 
investment banking services and companies for which sell-side analysts recommend 
shares (Burgman & Roos, 2007), or at the macro level by the wider institutional 
framework in which the sell-side analysts operate. 
 
Some studies highlight an optimism bias in sell-side analysts’ earnings forecasts (e.g., 
Chaney, Hogan & Jeter, 1999) and stock recommendations (e.g., Fogarty & Rogers, 
2005). Analysis of the distribution of sell-side analysts’ stock recommendations 
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reveals that sell-side analysts issue more buy recommendations than hold or sell 
recommendations. Analysts’ optimism bias is attributed to their incentives, which are 
partially influenced by stockbroking firms’ dependency on market actors for revenue 
(Carpenter, 2005). Since the analysts’ reward system is aligned with revenue 
generation for the stockbroking firm, analysts issue optimistic forecasts and 
recommendations that encourage trading volume and investment banking business.  
 
Bias also originates from sell-side analysts’ power plays with other actors (Zhang, 
2006). Analysts tend to positively bias earnings forecasts and recommendations due to 
their dependency on management for private information about the companies they 
follow (Das, Levine & Sivaramakrishnan, 1998). In this light, analysts tend to trade 
off accuracy in forecasts and recommendation, to a certain extent, for access to 
private information. Further, analysts’ herding behaviour, coupled with the need to 
protect their self interest (e.g. job security, reputation and promotion), may influence 
their willingness to compromise forecast accuracy by approximating consensus 
forecasts
4
.  
 
The literature supports the view that retail investors and buy-side analysts have 
different expectations from sell-side analysts. Retail investors are generally unaware 
of the level of bias of sell-side analysts in information dissemination in the form of 
earnings forecasts and buy/hold/sell recommendations. Retail investors appear to 
accept these recommendations on their face value, but buy-side analysts review the 
trends of such recommendations before making decisions (Boni & Womack, 2003). 
                                                 
4
 Hong, Kubik and Solomon (2000) found that less experienced analysts were more likely to lose their 
job for making a decision to deviate from the consensus forecast. 
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The regulations set by the USA Attorney General in 2003, the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission (ASIC), and Société Française des Analystes Financiers 
(SFAS) in 2002 highlight the repeated calls for truthful forecasts by sell-side analysts 
(Galanti, 2006). Research has largely neglected the influence of analysts’ incentives 
and the power-plays between stockbroking firms, institutional investors, companies 
followed and/or serviced by the analyst’s stockbroking firm, and individual analysts, 
and the resulting deception of retail investors who consume sell-side analysts’ reports. 
Because of its qualitative nature, IC information can be easily manipulated by sell-
side analysts to justify their forecasts and recommendations.  
 
Analysts’ ability to selectively use IC information to substantiate their position 
provides a different perspective for understanding IC disclosure in analysts’ reports 
and the sources of such information. Examination of sell-side analysts’ IC information 
sources, the type, nature and extent of IC disclosure in their reports, and how such 
information is linked with recommendations, earnings forecasts or price targets, from 
the perspective of analysts’ incentives and power relationships, is a worthwhile 
research undertaking. This issue is important in light of the empirical evidence that 
investors consider IC an economic asset; and that reporting such information shows a 
strong association with subsequent share returns, and a simultaneous augmentation 
between the market value and book value of firms (Amir, Lev & Sougiannis, 2003).  
 
3.3. Political economy of accounting view 
From the viewpoint of political economy, the productive exchange system of 
information between sell-side analysts and others is about the interplay of power and 
the goals of power-wielders. Political economy as a framework extends analysis from 
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market exchanges to the relationships between power-wielders (Jackson, 1982). 
Political economy analysis has the following three characteristics: first, it destroys the 
observed illusionary reality of social processes and structures; second, it elucidates the 
various ways of dominating, defining, mediating, and legitimating activities; third, it 
goes beyond economic efficiency and inquires about moral questions of justice, equity 
and public interest (Boczko, 2000). 
 
The focus of political economy analysis is upon the way an entity (e.g., firm, 
brokerage house) allocates resources and makes decisions from a broader perspective. 
In this broader perspective, the political economy view of the constitution of an entity 
has three dimensions: first, the entity is located in a society that is goal-directed and 
deliberately structured (Samson and Daft, 2003); second, it is a set of agreements and 
understandings which define limits and goals; and third, the entity creates rights and 
responsibilities for those who participate (constituents) in relation to it (Jackson, 
1982). 
 
Political economy is evidenced when accounting becomes a way for firms to sustain 
and legitimise their activities in the presence of social, economic, and political 
constituents (Cooper, 1980). Within this context, disclosure in accounting reports 
such as annual reports is viewed as a means to sustain and legitimise activities in the 
private interests of the entity (Abeysekera, 2006; Guthrie & Parker, 1990). 
Abeysekera (2008, pp. 23-35) found the political economy view to be a sound theory 
to explain IC disclosures in Sri Lankan annual company reports. It is suggested that 
the political economy view is also a suitable and germane way of analysing sell-side 
analysts’ practices.  
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From the political economy of accounting viewpoint, activities of firms for capital 
accumulation can create tension between entities and their constituents (Buhr, 1998). 
These entities then proactively provide disclosure from their perspective, to mediate, 
suppress, mystify or transform such tension (Guthrie & Parker, 1990).
5
 The 
institutional framework within which sell-side analysts operate is characterised by 
power play between various constituents as explained in the previous section. 
Evidence exists to suggest that the information disclosed in their reports is a product 
of the tensions between the individual analysts and their constituents. Nevertheless the 
political economy perspective has not been used to explain the IC information 
disclosure in analysts’ reports so far. The tension, and the way sell-side analysts set 
and shape their disclosure to reduce it, can be better understood by examining the 
motivations that lead to the disclosure of IC information in sell-side analysts’ reports 
(Puxty, Willmott, Cooper & Lowe, 1987). 
 
3.4. Globalisation 
Globalisation has extended the interactions between retail investors, institutional 
investors, buy-side analysts and sell-side analysts beyond national boundaries. 
Although there are competing arguments and propositions about the effects of 
globalisation on developing economies, the reality is that it has changed the 
composition of the constituents involved in determining the value creation of firms, 
namely political, economic and social – from a national to an international level. The 
breaking down of geographic barriers, decreasing transaction costs, and more freely 
available capital in the intangible economy affect the entire world. These phenomena 
                                                 
5
 Proactivenss of firms in disclosing information distinguishes the political economy view from 
legitimacy theory (Abeysekera & Guthrie, 2005) 
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have made IC more valuable, allowing knowledge-based firms to earn even greater 
profits (Daley, 2001). These changes in the dynamics of constituents can contribute to 
variations in industry-specific risks and market risks. Hence, the examination of sell-
side analysts’ practices and the information they disseminate in the context of 
developing economies requires a framework that recognises the effects of 
globalisation.  
 
Capital concentration and dispersion between countries is a fruitful perspective from 
which to explore the utilisation and disclosure of IC information by sell-side analysts. 
For instance, Arvidsson (2003) found that analysts’ reports of internationally listed 
companies disclosed more intangibles information than analysts’ reports of 
domestically listed companies. According to the peripheral capitalism perspective, the 
articulation of mechanisms such as globalisation and capital markets in 
underdeveloped economies within the world economic system results in the transfer 
of resources from developing countries (peripheries) to the centres of global capital in 
the developed countries. The largely unidirectional transfer of capital, through various 
mechanisms that block its equitable flow, can enable the centres to distort the 
allocation of resources in the periphery (Henry, 1985). The peripheral capitalism 
perspective helps us understand the role of sell-side analysts in disclosing IC in the 
larger context of capital migration across the globe. 
 
4. Methodological perspectives 
Research on sell-side analysts’ information intermediation role has largely employed 
statistical analytical techniques. This is because such studies have been driven by 
investigating the variables recognised in financial statements using data available 
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from external databases. Studies investigating non-financial and IC information use 
and disclosure by sell-side analysts have primarily relied upon content analysis 
methodology (Arvidsson, 2003; Flöstrand, 2006; García-Meca, 2005). More recently, 
scholars have applied qualitative techniques based on case study interviews to 
understand the broader dynamics of sell-side analysts’ use and disclosure of IC 
information (Bukh & Nielsen, 2006; Johansson, 2007).  
 
Although many authors have been quick to commend content analysis for producing 
objective, systematic and reliable data analysis (Guthrie & Petty, 2000), few have 
addressed the methodological problems associated with this technique, that can distort 
findings, or have doubted the credibility of the original textual source (Abeysekera, 
2006). The researcher can control many limitations by carefully planning the research.  
 
One major limitation associated with the content analysis method is subjectivity 
involved in the coding process. For instance, the method is heavily reliant on the 
integrity of the coder or researcher. None of the studies on IC disclosure by sell-side 
analysts, and few IC disclosure studies, have addressed how subjectivity in the coding 
process is mitigated either by using multiple coders, objective coding instruments or 
repeating the coding process.  
 
There are issues relating to the operationalising of content analysis. Initially, a 
decision must be made as to the information unit to be counted (i.e. word, sentence or 
paragraphs) in analysts’ reports. For pragmatic reasons, researchers generally use 
either sentence or paragraph counts, which enable the meanings of terms to be 
understood in the context of other information. Computerised content analysis 
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techniques, which have also been used in the sell-side analyst literature on 
information disclosure, use word counts, either with or without regard to the context 
in which words appear (Previts et al., 1994).  
 
Another issue in content analysis is dealing with sentences or paragraphs that give rise 
to more than one intellectual capital item or ‘attribute’. One or more IC attribute(s) 
can give rise to an IC category such as human capital, internal capital, and external 
capital. Frequency of mention of IC items and IC subcategories may differ depending 
on how a particular paragraph is coded. This has a direct impact on the conclusions 
drawn, as frequency of disclosure denotes the importance of an IC attribute. 
Additionally, there are issues related to converting non-narrative information such as 
pictures, charts, tables, and numerical figures (both fiscal and non-fiscal) into a 
quantitative form to be analysed by content analysis. 
  
Operational definitions of IC items and categories can give rise to differences in both 
results and interpretation. For instance, Gacia-Meca (2005) described the level of IC 
disclosed in analysts’ reports by categorising items into employees, customers, IT, 
processes, R&D and strategic statements, whereas Flöstrand (2006) used a tripartite 
categorisation of human, structural and relational capital and Arvidsson (2003) 
categorised IC into human, relational, structural, R&D and environ/social. Such 
diversity in categories as well as in the IC items grouped within the categories may 
distort comparison of findings as well as reliability of interpretation of results.  
 
Another methodological issue relates to the way disclosure indices are operationalised 
in content analysis. One variant of content analysis methodology records the 
 19 
frequency of disclosure of each index item in every source document. According to 
this method, the importance of a particular item relative to others is interpreted by its 
total frequency count in the whole sample. In the other variant, source documents are 
searched for the presence or absence of particular items listed in the disclosure index. 
If an item is found, then the document is not further scrutinised for multiple 
occurrences of that item. This method assigns importance to disclosure of index items 
by counting the number of source documents in the sample disclosing the particular 
item. The results of analysis may differ depending on which variant is applied. 
 
The type and amount of disclosure of IC information in sell-side analysts’ reports may 
vary between initiation coverage and recurrent analysts’ reports. Initiation coverage 
reports provide an opportunity for analysts to discuss a company and its expected 
future performance at greater length than in recurrent reports, and it is expected that 
more qualitative information should be available from the narratives of these reports. 
Flöstrand (2006) found that the length of analysts’ reports was positively associated 
with the number of IC indicators disclosed. Research that does not distinguish 
between recurrent and initiation coverage reports is unlikely to provide an accurate 
description of the use of IC information by sell-side analysts under differing 
circumstances.  
 
Studies also differ in the way the sample of analysts’ reports is selected. Most studies 
analyse a large sample of analysts’ reports on an equally large number of companies. 
In contrast, Nielsen (2004) examined 12 analysts’ reports written on one particular 
company.  
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Due to the inherent limitations of content analysis methodology, frequency of 
disclosure cannot be used as the sole method for inferring importance attached to IC 
items and categories. The dynamic nature of sell-side analysts’ activities calls for 
more insight into their work products through case study methodology. Prior research 
into information use by sell-side analysts has used multiple methods within studies; 
but such an approach has not yet being employed in order to investigate IC 
use/disclosure by analysts. Between-method triangulation can provide more complete 
and reliable evidence (Shields, 1997). Combining content analysis and case study 
methodologies can immensely enhance our understanding of the use and disclosure of 
IC information by sell-side analysts.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
The non-specificity of certain IC items, the complexity in associating IC items with 
firm value creation, and the difficulty of measuring IC items are factors that have 
limited empirical literature on the relationship between IC and the market value of 
firms. In the current economy, which is characterised by knowledge and information, 
IC has a significant bearing on firm value creation. Sell-side analysts as information 
intermediaries enlighten the capital market about the expected future value of firms 
through their reports using earnings forecasts, price targets, stock recommendations 
and narrative comments. Examining the work product of sell-side analysts provides an 
alternative perspective for understanding the impact of IC on the market value of 
firms.  
 
The disclosure of IC by sell-side analysts is a product of complex interactions. At a 
micro level, stockbroking firms which employ the analysts, buy-side analysts, 
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investment banking clients of the analysts’ stockbroking firms, individual analyst’s 
willingness to herd with other analysts, and their self interest have an influence on 
sell-side analysts’ IC disclosure in their reports. At a macro level, the stock exchange 
and government as regulators and policy-makers can influence the nature and the 
coverage of IC disclosure (Burgman & Roos, 2007). At a global level, the extent of 
openness to the forces of globalisation, buy-side analysts and retail investors can 
influence IC disclosure to meet expectations. Hence, it appears that IC disclosure by 
sell-side analysts is a product of proactive and reactive interaction. Sell-side analyst 
research to date highlights the incompleteness of sell-side analysts’ reports, especially 
in relation to non-financial information (Abdolmohammadi, Simnett, Thibodeau & 
Wright, 2006), and over-optimism. However, sell-side analysts frequently use IC 
indicators in their reports, variably across industry sectors, with the majority of them 
referring to external capital (Flöstrand, 2006). With research supporting the view that 
buy-side analysts listen to sell-side analysts’ recommendations for superior 
performance (Li, 2005), study is warranted of the neutrality of IC information 
disclosed and presented by sell-side analysts.  
 
The theoretical underpinning of research into sell-side analysts’ IC use and disclosure 
is in its infancy, and it is an opportune time to investigate possible theoretical 
foundations for such research. IC disclosure in sell-side analysts’ reports can be 
understood in terms of signalling, analysts’ incentives and influences, the political 
economy view and globalisation, to name a few perspectives. Although positivist 
theories can certainly contribute to this process, it is argued that critical perspectives 
can enrich and diversify the research base. 
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The recent welcome trend in sell-side analyst research using qualitative research 
methods, both content analysis and case study interviews, would benefit from more 
rigor in methodologies. It is recommended that future research into IC information 
use/disclosure by sell-side analysts use a combination of methods to enhance the 
validity and reliability of findings. This paper is just the foundation for research into 
IC disclosure by sell-side analysts. 
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